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threat of suit with a judicial pronouncement of his patent's validity, competi-
tors are not likely to risk a court battle. Only the most determined infringers
will contest a patent once pronounced valid by a court.30 The others must pay
tribute to the patentee for the legal privilege of using his "invention,"3 1 Or
if they cannot afford the license fees, they will have to stop using their "in-
fringing" device. In either event, the benefits of competition are unjustifiably
denied the public.38
To remove spurious patents as a block to competition, district courts
should adopt flexible modes of procedure. Uninfringed patents should not be
pronounced valid since that finding may bolster an unearned monopoly. Con-
versely, courts should not postpone decision when they can wipe out invalid
grants. If district courts persist in needlessly finding patents valid and in
ignoring evidence of invalidity, courts of appeal should correct them and point
the way.3 9
36. Of course all existing patents threaten competitors to some degree. See Addresso-
graph-Multigraph Corp. v. Cooper, 156 F.2d 483, 485 (2d Cir. 1946) ; Bresnick v. U.S.
Vitamin Corp., 139 F.2d 239, 242 (2d Cir. 1943; Cover v. Schwartz, 133 F.2d 541, 545
(2d Cir. 1942) (concurring opinion). This, however, is a price necessarily paid, under
the present system, for encouraging invetition. An unnecessary declaration of validity,
on the other hand, may pay the price with no corresponding return. See Harrics v. Air
King Products Co., 183 F.2d 158, 163 (2d Cir. 1950); Wabash Corp. v. Ross Electric
Corp., 187 F.2d 577, 593 (partially concurring and partially dissenting opinion).
37. An important incident of patent ownership is the right to grant licenses which
permit others to make, use, or sell the patented invention. A customary payment for
such privilege is a license fee, i.e. a lump-sum payment made at the time of the agreement.
BENNETT, THE AMERICAN PATENT SYsTEM 153-181 (1943).
As to the way in which threat of suit may compel competitors to abandon use of a
device or enter into license agreements, see Aero Spark Plug Co. v. B.G. Corp., 130 F,2d
290, 292 (2d Cir. 1942) (concurring opinion); HAMILTON PATENTS AND FREE ENTE -
PRISE 111 (TNEC Monograph 31, 1941); BENNETT, Tn- AMERICAN PATENT SYSTEM
106 (1943).
38. For the harmful effects to the public caused by the use of an invalid patent, see
BENNETT, THE AMERICAN PATENT SYsTMx 107 (1943); Brown, Development its the
Patent Law as Affected by Adjudication, 22 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'" 587 (1940); Evans,
Some Stray Thoughts of a Federal Jedge on our Patent System and its Operation, 27 J.
PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 293, 308 (1945).
39. This correction may consist of mere verbal reproof. On the other hand, appellate
tribunals may use the direct method of expunging superflous findings of validity from
the record. See Wabash Corp. v. Ross Electric Corp., 187 F.2d 577, 587 (2d Cir. 1951)
(partially concurring and partially dissenting opinion). And they may reform decree
to include holdings of invalidity, whenever such reform is warranted.
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THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION:
THE DOCTRINE OF WAIVER*
THE effectiveness of the privilege against self-incrimination 1 is lessened by
several judicial rules regulating its application. The privilege can be invoked
only by claiming it specifically.2 Even when claimed the privilege is unavail-
able if the court thinks that no possible answer to a question would tend to
incriminate.3 Moreover, a witness may be compelled to answer clearly incrnm-
inating questions if a statute guarantees immunity from prosecution.4 Finally,
the privilege may be lost by "constructive waiver" inferred from answers to
prior questions.
As evolved in state courts, the constructive waiver doctrine has been applied
with varying degrees of severity. Some courts have held that where a witness
enters upon the exposition of a particular transaction, even though he has not
yet incriminated himself, he must go on and make a full disclosure. The more
*Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951), rehcaring denied 341 U.S. 912 (1951).
1. "No person... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself." U.S. CoNsT. A=aIND. V. See generally Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S.
547 (1892); Corwin, The Supreme Court's Construction of the Sclf-Incritrination Clause,
29 MAicn. L. REv. 1, 191 (1930), which details the way in which 100 years of interpreta-
tion have overcome the limitations of the phrase "criminal case!' so as to protect witnesses
in grand jury and legislative investigations, civil trials, and practically all other pro-
ceedings.
2. The usual phrase is that the privilege must be "in some manner fairly brought to
the attention of the tribunal. . . :' United States ex rel. Vajtauer v. Commissioner of
Immigration, 273 U.S. 103, 113 (1927).
3. Mason v. United States, 244 U.S. 362 (1917). See also 19 Mf:rui. L 1"€r. 426
(1935).
The guiding principle was first stated by Chief Justice Marshall:
"[T]he court ought never to compel a witness to give an answer which discloses
a fact that would form a necessary and essential part of a crime which is punishable
by the laws." I; re Willie, 25 Fed. Cas. 38, 40, No. 14, 692e (C.C.D. Va. 107).
See also United States v. Cusson, 132 F.2d 413, 414 (2d. Cir. 1942) :
"It is obvious that no general principle can be laid down; the question is always
whether the danger to be apprehended from an answer is near enough to be real,
or whether it is too remote to be substantial"
On the purpose and operation of the privilege, see Reg. v. Boyes, 1 B. & S. 311 (1861);
Comment, 49 YAE L.J. 1059 (1940); Shientag, The Right to Refuse to Answer, N. Y.
Times Mag., April 22, 1951, p. 20.
4. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896) (the first decision to uphold an immunity
statute, on the ground that it afforded all the protection of the privilege). But cf. Counsel-
man v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892) (striking down the first immunity statute as
not affording a protection co-e-xtensive with the privilege). For general discussion and
history, see United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424 (1942) ; 8 AV,.soni, Ev-mzzuc § 2231
(3d ed. 1940) (hereafter cited NVIGOE).
5. Foster v. Pierce, 65 Mass. (11 Cush.) 437 (1853); State v. Nichols, 29 Minn.
357 (1882); Town of Norfolk v. Gaylord, 28 Conn. 309 (1859). Cf. Ginn v. Common-
wealth, 15 Ky. (5 Litt.) 300 (1824).
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
general rule is that when a witness voluntarily admits some connection with a
crime, he must then tell the whole story.' A few courts find waiver only after
a witness has confessed to all the formal elements of a crime.1
In Rogers v. United Statess the Supreme Court for the first time used
constructive waiver to deny a witness protection of the privilege. Jane Rogers
was one of several persons cited for contempt in the course of a grand jury
investigation of Communist Party activities in ColoradoY After admitting that
she had been treasurer of the Party, she refused to disclose the name of the
person to whom she had turned over records formerly in her keeping."' She
6. State v. Foster, 23 N.H. 348 (1851) ; People v. Freshour, 55 Cal. 375 (1880). See
also Commonwealth v. Price, 76 Mass. (10 Gray) 472 (1858). People v. Freshour coll-
tains a typical statement of the transaction theory:
"If a witness discloses a part of a transaction with which lie was criminally cot-
cerned, without claiming his privilege, he must disclose the whole." Id. at 377.
7. United States v. St. Pierre, 132 F.2d 837 (2d. Cir. 1942) ; Eggers v. Fox, 177 Ill. 185
(1898). Cf. Foster v. People, 18 Mich. 266 (1869), which is most frequently cited ill
support of the looser rule (see note 6 supra), but whose holding on the facts is more
in line with the St. Pierre rule.
8. 340 U.S. 367 (1951), rehearing denied 341 U.S. 912 (1951). See also Rogers v.
United States, 179 F.2d 559 (10th Cir. 1950). The Rogers case grew out of the same
grand jury investigation as, and was argued along with, Blau v. United States, 340 U.S.
159 (1950).
Arndstein v. McCarthy, 254 U.S. 71 and 379 (1920), previously the controlling Su-
preme Court decision, held that the defendant, who claimed his privilege in the course of
a bankruptcy examination subsequent to having filed an involuntary bankruptcy, had not
waived his privilege by virtue of the original filing. For further litigation, see McCarthy
v. Arndstein, 262 U.S. 355 (1923); McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34 (1924). See
also note 6 of Mr. Justice Black's dissent in the principal case, 340 U.S. 367, 378-379,
criticizing the majority's reinterpretation of the Arndstein case. The Arndslein decisions
relied upon the broad interpretation of the privilege arrived at in the leading case of
Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892), supra note 4; and on the even broader
English rule first enunciated in Reg. v. Garbett, 2 Car. & K. 474, 175 Eng. Rep. 196
(1847), infra note 24. For adverse comment on the Arndstein holding, see 8 Wiltfmolm
§ 2276 n. 5.
9. It is noteworthy that the court of appeals, while affirming Mrs. Rogers' conviction,
pointedly criticized both the tactics of the Special United States Attorney in charge and
the trial proceedings. Rogers v. United States, 179 F.2d 559, 561 (10th Cir. 1950).
10. The reason for her refusal was initially and naively expressed as follows:
"'I don't feel that I should subject a person or persons to the same thing that I'm
going through.'" Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 369 n.1 (1951).
The Court perhaps considered this to be an independent ground of its decision.
While there are numerous decisions to the effect that the privilege is for personal
protection only, United States v. Herron, 28 F.2d 122 (N.D. Cal. 1928), citing Ex parte
Irvine, 74 Fed. 954 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1896), is some authority that a witness can claim the
privilege "irrespective of his motive." Id. at 123. But see People v. Schultz, 380 Ill.
539, 41 N.E.2d 754 (1942) (refusal to answer solely to protect third party not allowed) ;
United States v. St. Pierre, 132 F.2d 837 (2d Cir. 1942) (see note 14 infra) ; and Hale




argued that an answer to the question could incriminate her under the Smith
Act, which makes it a crime to be a member of a group which one knows advo-
cates the forceful overthrow of the government." The Supreme Court said
that since no answer to the question to which Mrs. Rogers refused to respund
could further incriminate her after she had admitted party membership, she
could not invoke the privilege.' 2
The reasoning in Rogers suggests that the Court sanctioned only the most
limited type of waiver-that arising after full voluntary incrimination. But the
facts of the case indicate a rule of broader application. The Smith Act does not
make a crime of mere membership and activity in a group advocating forceful
overthrow of the government; it also requires that the accused know of this
purpose.' 3 Mrs. Rogers had not yet admitted such knowledge, and it is con-
ceivable that the person who replaced her as treasurer could help a prosecut sr
to establish this knowledge.
In line with prior cases, Rogers makes it clear that, once there has been si ,me
disclosure, a person can be forced to give evidentiary leads to help convict
himself.' 4 Even if 'Mrs. Rogers had already confessed all the elements neces-
sary for conviction under the Smith Act, further details could be of aid in' a
W1rhile Mrs. Rogers did not at first refuse to answer because of her privilege, neither
was there any evidence that the original finding of contempt was lsascd on the dcctrinc
of waiver. See full transcript appended to principal case, 340 U.S. 367, 331-332 11951 j.
11. 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (Supp. 1951). In Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159 11950)
the Court held that answers to questions as to membership in the Ctmmunist Party %%,ere
privileged as tending to incriminate under the Smith Act. Prior to the Blau dcicin,
this was an open question. See Alexander v. United States, 131 F.2d 4O (9th Cir.
1950) (after much judicial difficulty, a divided court en banc held refusal to answer
justified).
12. Rogers v. United States. 340 U.S. 367. 374-5 (1951).
13 The pertinent phrase of 18 U.S.C. §2385 (Supp. 1951) reads:
"or becomes or is a member of, or affiliates with, any 'such society, group, or
assembly of persons, knowing the purposes thereof...."
See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 499-500 (1951), for indication that intent is
an essential element of proof under the Smith Act.
14. The case most in point, prior to the Rogers decision, was United States v. St.
Pierre, 132 F.2d 837 (2d Cir. 1942), appeal dismissed as varot, 319 U.S. 41 l142*;
noted, 56 Hnv. L. REv. 832 (1943). The grand jury witness in this case testifiel to
having committed the crime of embezzlement; he subsequently refused to divulge the
name of the person to whom he had given the embezzled money. Judge Learnel Hand
sustained the contempt conviction on the doctrine of waiver, holding that the witness had
disclosed all the elements of the crime of embezzlement. Judge Jerome Franl,, in an
informed and helpful dissent, maintained that the government's case was "incomplete"
without disclosure of the fact demanded. (See Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 375
n. 19 (1951), for the majority's surprising intimation of a possible agreement with Judge
Frank's point here.)
The question of "evidentiary leads" is all-important, since the point is not to indict but
to convict. After all, the government's whole case might hinge upon a "detail," and if
such a "detail" is not privileged, the Constitutional provision would seem very much on
the wane.
1952]
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successful prosecution. The government might not be willing to go to court
on the basis of a bare admission of formal elements.
The Supreme Court apparently equates waiver at a grand jury hearing with
waiver at a trial. But the great majority of early waiver cases were adversary
proceedings.' 5 And the usual justification of the doctrine is that in its absence
a witness for one side would be able, under questioning of friendly counsel, to
present a distorted picture of the facts, while escaping the corrective of a
vigorous cross-examination."0 Instead of ruling out such one-sided testimony
altogether,17 courts preferred to use waiver to protect the rights of parties.
They required disclosure of "details" to place the testimony in a balanced per-
spective, and to ensure a fair trial.'8 The right of the witness was sacrificed
to the right of the adverse party.
This doctrine, along with its rationale, has been applied uncritically to in-
quisitorial proceedings.' 0 The desirability of this extension is questionable.
Although grand jury or legislative hearings may result in accusations against
individuals, there are no "adverse" parties whose rights to cross-examination
might be jeopardized by partial disclosure.20 And in an inquisitorial proceeding
thp witness is entirely in the hands of counsel for the state who may subject
the witness to questioning equivalent to a searching cross-examination. In
addition, the balance of interests here is between the state's right to information
15. See e.g., Foster v. People, 18 Mich. 266 (1869) which is among the most frequently
cited authorities. For early leading cases see 8 WIGNIORE § 2276 n. 1; 147 A.L.R. 255-82;
the Solicitor General's brief in the principle case, particularly at p. 26; and notes 5, 6, atd
7 supra. The doctrine of waiver seems to have been developed in the early state cases,
which deal mainly with problems arising upon cross-examination.
16. A typical rationale of the doctrine of waiver is that in Commonwealth v. Price,
76 Mass. (10 Gray) 472, 476 (1858) :
"If he [the witness, an accomplice] could be allowed so to do [to claim his privilege
on cross], injustice might be done to the defendant, either by the keeping back of
testimony which would tend directly to his acquittal, or which would so discredit
the witness as to induce the jury wholly to disregard his previous testimony."
17. Historically, this was an early technique used both here and in England. See
Pinkard v. State, 30 Ga. 757 (1860); Dandridge v. Corden, 3 Car. & P. 11, 172 Eng.
Rep. 300 (1827). For an early rationale of the attitude against waiver, see Mayo v.
Mayo, 119 Mass. 290 (1876), where it was held that the judge might instruct as to the
privilege at a late hour-
"otherwise the witness might be entrapped into a position where his privilege as a
witness would be entirely defeated by his ignorance, and he would be obliged fully
to incriminate himself." Id. at 292.
See notes 23 and 24 infra.
18. Cf. Commonvealth v. Price, supra note 16.
19. See, e.g., Ex parte Adams, 76 Tex. Crim. Rep. 277, 174 S.W. 1044 (1915), citing
Ex Parte Park, 37 Tex. Crim. Rep. 590, 40 S.V. 300 (1897), both non-adversary pro.
ceedings, where the same reasons for the holding are given which had been offered in
adversary proceedings for 75 years.
20. See Frank, J., dissenting, in United States v. St. Pierre, 132 F.2d 837, 845 (2d
Cir. 1942). See also note 22 infra.
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]NOTES
and the witness' right not to incriminate himself. Sacrifice of the witness'
right to that of the state attacks the underlying purpose of the privilege-to
prevent the state from forcing incrimination by abuse of the inquisitorial
method.2 ' It is one thing to limit the privilege in order to safeguard adver-
saries in a trial ;22 it is quite another to weaken its protection against the very
dangers which first made it necessary.
Application of the waiver doctrine to inquisitorial proceedings creates a
dilemma for witnesses which endangers their rights and at the same time may
hamper the truth-seelng function of these hearings. Answering questions
causes loss of the privilege; refusal to answer may bring on contempt sen-
tences. 23 Since the average witness will surely be uncertain when and when
not to answer, he will probably try to say as little as possible. He will sent-
tinize each question for hidden and remote dangers. The number of contempt
proceedings may increase, but by thus making witnesses wary, the state will
simply get less information.
Assuming the value of protection against self-incrimination, the best solution
for the problem created by waiver in inquisitorial proceedings would be the
English rule that a witness may claim his privilege at any stage of the inquiry.2 1
But the English rule is unlikely to be accepted in this country because of the
21. On the history of the privilege, see note 3 supra; 8 WzGmon § 2230; and Corwin,
supra note 1. Briefly put, the privilege developed as both a popular and judicial reaction
against the cx officio oath of criminal equity (which had a religious background), and
particularly the procedures of the infamous Star Chamber.
22. This Note makes no attempt to discuss the doctrine of waiver as applied to
adversary proceedings; the argument here is simply that the same considerations do not
apply to inquisitorial hearings. See United States v. St. Pierre, 132 F2d 837, 840 (2d. Cir.
1942) and Judge Frank, dissenting, at 845.
23. See Black, J., dissenting, in Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 375-81 (1951).
For another discussion of the witness' dilenma, see Estes Y. Potter, 183 F.24 SG5, US
(5th Cir. 1950).
24. Reg. v. Garbett, 2 Car. & K. 474, 175 Eng. Rep. 196 (1847). This very interest-
ing case concerned a witness in a forgery trial, an attorney, who was forced by the judge
on grounds of waiver, to give a self-incriminating answer: it was held that the evidence
so gained could not later be used against him. The decision reversed earlier precedent,
and stopped once and for all the growth of an American style doctrine of waiver. For
modern cases on the English rule, see 13 HALSEURY, LAws OF Er:OLAND 730-3 (2d ed.
1934).
For occasional American applications of the English rule, see Chesapeake Club v.
State, 63 Aid. 446 (1885); State v. Allen, 183 Md. 603, 39 A2d 820 (1944); and
critical comment in 10 MND. L. REv. 158 (1949). See also Pe-ple v. Giallarenzi, 150 Mice.
11, 268 N.Y. Supp. 488 (Sup. Ct. 1934). For an early view favoring the English rule,
see People v. Mead, 50 Mich. 228, 15 N.V. 95 (1883) ; and a critical discussion of Judge
Cooley's ideas in 8 WIGMoRE 449.
For an on-the-point discussion of the modern waiver doctrine, se Heylcr, Przqiljeg
against Self-Incrimination in Federal Grand Jury Proccedings, 3S CAn'. L RE%-. 924,
930-1 (1950).
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